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Building Labor’s Constitution
Kate Andrias*
Introduction
In recent years, in the face of the Great Recession and skyrocketing
economic inequality, there has been a resurgence of economic justice
movements among low-wage workers.1 Take the “Fight for $15,” which
began with a few hundred workers in New York but is now national in
scope.2 Fast-food workers, airport and retail workers, home-health aides,
and even adjunct professors all now demand substantially higher wages and
the right to form a union.3 The campaign has pulled off strikes in cities
across the country.4 It has had stunning success in raising local and state
minimum wages, while shifting the terms of the national debate.5
The Fight for $15 and other low-wage worker campaigns are making
rights-based claims: they demand higher wages, better conditions, and
unions, as of right. They use language like “dignity” and “bills of rights,”

* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. For helpful conversations and
comments, I am grateful to fellow participants at the Texas Law Review Symposium on the
Constitution and Economic Inequality, and particularly to Willy Forbath and Joey Fishkin.
Thanks also to Sam Bagenstos, Daniel Halberstam, Don Herzog, Ellen Katz, Bill Novak, Richard
Primus, Ted St. Antoine, and Peter Strauss; participants at the Columbia Law School Public Law
workshop; and the editors of the Texas Law Review. Caitlin Fitzgerald, Lexi Peacock, and Megan
Pierce provided excellent research assistance.
1. See Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The Year’s Biggest Social Justice Stories, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/opinion/the-years-biggest-social-justicestories.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3KWC-ZT8Y] (collecting 2015’s top social justice stories—
including the fast-food worker strikes).
2. Lydia DePillis, It’s Not Just Fast Food: The Fight for $15 Is for Everyone Now, WASH.
POST (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/12/04/its-not-just
-fast-food-the-fight-for-15-is-for-everyone-now/ [https://perma.cc/WVH7-YEUJ].
3. Id.; Justine Hofherr, In Boston, the Fight for Better Pay Goes Beyond Fast Food,
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.boston.com/jobs/news/2015/04/15/boston-the-fight-for
-better-pay-goes-beyond-fast-food/BDdWh0WFRkUlFvvj6NvveP/story.html
[https://perma.cc/
BE44-S4JD]. More precisely, the campaign demands the right to form a union “free of
intimidation.” See Arun Gupta, Fight for 15 Confidential: How Did the Biggest-Ever
Mobilization of Fast-Food Workers Come About, and What Is Its Endgame?, IN THESE TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://inthesetimes.com/article/15826/fight_for_15_confidential [https://perma
.cc/H36G-BX94].
4. Bruce Horovitz & Yamiche Alcindor, Fast-Food Strikes Widen into Social-Justice
Movement, USA TODAY (Apr. 15, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
2015/04/15/fast-food-strike-fight-for-15-service-employees-international-union/25787045/
[https://perma.cc/GVR3-V4RN].
5. Chris Kirkham & Samantha Masunaga, Why the Success of the $15 Minimum Wage
Movement Has Surprised Its Leaders, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes
.com/business/la-fi-1111-minimum-wage-protests-20151111-story.html
[https://perma.cc/324T
-THVH].
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and they employ similar tactics to those of earlier rights-based social
movements: marches, civil disobedience, and mass protests.6
But unlike many movements on both the Left and Right, and unlike
earlier incarnations of the labor movement, contemporary worker
movements make almost no appeal to the Constitution. While an
occasional worker or labor leader may articulate his or her claims as based
in protections for free speech, or may exclaim against involuntary servitude,
worker justice movements in the United States do not invoke the
Constitution in any serious or systemic way.7
In their important new work, William Forbath and Joey Fishkin seek to
change this.8 They lament the absence of constitutional argumentation by
progressives concerned about economic inequality. They show that during
earlier periods of American history the Constitution was understood as
central to problems of political economy. They describe a “Great
Forgetting” of this past and they exhort political and social actors to once
again understand demands for a more egalitarian, inclusive, and democratic
political economy as constitutionally grounded.9 Forbath and Fishkin are
not alone. In the last few years, other scholars have sought to revitalize a
range of constitutional arguments against mounting economic inequality
generally and the plight of workers in particular,10 and have urged social
movements to adopt those arguments.11

6. See infra Part II (describing the Fight for $15, Domestic Workers Alliance movement, and
other low-wage worker campaigns).
7. See infra notes 72–83 and accompanying text.
8. JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3) (on file with the Texas Law Review) [hereinafter FISHKIN &
FORBATH, ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION] (arguing that government has a constitutional
obligation to prevent oligarchy, preserve a broad middle class, and construct a democracy of
inclusion and opportunity and urging the recovery of a tradition in which issues of political
economy are understood as constitutional); accord Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The
Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 672 (2014) [hereinafter Fishkin & Forbath,
Anti-Oligarchy Constitution]; Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Great Society and the
Constitution of Opportunity, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 1017, 1022–23 (2014) [hereinafter Fishkin &
Forbath, Great Society]; Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, & The
Constitution of Opportunity: A Story of Two Traditions, 38 NOMOS (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 3) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620920 [https://perma.cc/
PU79-YMLW] [hereinafter Fishkin & Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth].
9. See Fishkin & Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, supra note 8, at 1, 6–7, 28 (recognizing
that the problems of economic and political inequality are well known, but arguing that Americans
have “forgotten” or “lost the constitutional stakes—the sense that these threats to our democracy
of opportunity are threats, as well, to our constitutional order”); see also Fishkin & Forbath, AntiOligarchy Constitution, supra note 8, at 670 (describing “forgotten” tradition and urging
recovery); Fishkin & Forbath, Great Society, supra note 8, at 1023 (recounting how the
“Constitution of Opportunity” was “forgotten”).
10. See, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class
Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 329 (arguing for an alternative, more
holistic, measure of political power that would require reconsideration of the suspect class status
of groups like the poor); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in
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I am sympathetic to arguments in favor of a “constitution of
opportunity” or an “anti-oligarchy” constitution. At the same time, I want
to take seriously the choice of worker movements not to lay claim to the
Constitution. That is, I want to offer some thoughts as to why they are not
doing so—reasons that stem more from conflict and loss than from
forgetting—and to suggest that what they are doing instead might be a
necessary precondition to the kind of constitutional argumentation that
Forbath, Fishkin, and others urge.
So why don’t worker movements invoke the Constitution?
The problem is not the lack of a blueprint. Scholars have explained
how the Constitution can be read to support rights to decent employment
and unionization.12 The arguments rest on the First, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments; the Guarantee Clause; as well as the
Constitution’s overall structure, purpose, and history. Many of these
arguments are conceptually sound—at least as sound as other constitutional
arguments that form our doctrine.13 Some are consistent in principle with
the received wisdom regarding the original understanding of the
Constitution and the Reconstruction Amendments. And several boast
impressive pedigrees. Earlier worker movements have looked to the
Constitution as a source of inspiration for their demands. On occasion,
such movements have prevailed on elected officials to accept their
constitutional vision.
To be sure, courts do not currently embrace these arguments.14 Yet the
absence of supporting precedent is only a partial answer to the question:
Why no constitutional argumentation? Successful social movements, past
and current, have invoked the Constitution even when their aspirations
required changes to the ruling doctrines of constitutional law.15 They direct

Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1–3) (critiquing
constitutional theory for giving insufficient attention to economic inequality); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1531–33 (2015) (arguing that
a group is relatively powerless and therefore entitled to heightened scrutiny if its “policy
preferences are less likely to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups” and
arguing, on that theory, for protection of the poor (emphasis omitted)). On recent scholarship
regarding labor rights, see infra Part I.
11. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561, 606 (2014) (urging worker groups to invoke constitutional arguments
about the freedom of assembly as “a new rhetorical tool in the struggle to win hearts and minds”).
12. See infra Part I.
13. Cf. Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1133–34
(2013) (describing the gap between the text of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause, and related doctrine).
14. See infra Part III.
15. For a recent overview of the legal and sociological literature on constitutional change,
courts, and social movements, see Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social
Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 877–78 (2013); see also infra notes 84–87 and accompanying
text.
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their arguments to the public and to constitutional actors outside the
Court—legislators and executives, among others. Such argumentation
provides inspiration and a source for organizational strength and
legitimacy.16 And the hope is that, over time, the courts will come to accept
the movement’s view of the Constitution.
Labor, however, appears to eschew this strategy. To understand why,
one must consider the movement’s relationship to courts and to legal elites
more generally.17 U.S. courts are not good venues for labor. The history of
judicial antagonism dates back over one hundred years, when judges
frequently enjoined workers’ collective action using conspiracy and
antitrust law, while striking down protective employment legislation under
a liberty-of-contract theory.18 Court hostility to worker movements
continues today.19 And the problem goes beyond the hostility of particular
judges to unions. The deepest aspirations of the labor movement are
fundamentally mismatched with court-derived constitutional rights as they
have developed in the United States. The doctrine’s strong distinctions
between the public and private spheres of life and between negative and
positive rights pose significant challenges for constitutional labor rights.20
Indeed, a more fundamental conflict may exist: the goal of labor law,
at least from the perspective of the most utopian elements of the labor
movement, is to democratize control over workers’ lives and, more broadly,
over the economy and politics. Appeals to courts are in tension with this
aim. Federal courts are, after all, designed to be insulated, elite institutions.
Even assuming that courts are often responsive to popular sentiment, court
definition of constitutional rights is a largely nondemocratic process—at
least under our current system of judicial supremacy.21
16. See Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 668 (2012)
(recognizing that advocates can “use litigation to . . . obtain leverage with government officials,
convince the public, and influence elites,” and that benefits may result simply from the act of
claiming rights).
17. There are, of course, other explanations for why some of the constitutional arguments on
offer may not be taken up. For example, those who seek to apply antislavery arguments to
contemporary labor problems may risk being accused of inappropriately appropriating (or even
minimizing) the horrific experience of a particular racial group. They also may face wariness
from groups of workers who do not wish to be associated with the experience of chattel slavery.
Or, quite simply, the problems facing workers today may simply not feel like problems analogous
to slavery. This Essay explores one reason for labor’s reluctance to make constitutional
arguments without suggesting the reason is fully explanatory.
18. See CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 44–52, 61–67 (1985)
(recounting the courts’ treatment of collective action and the conflict between courts and the
American Federation of Labor); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor
Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1185–95 (1989) [hereinafter Forbath, Shaping American
Labor] (describing the response of courts to labor movements in America).
19. See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 140–142 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 97–100, 148–50 and accompanying text.

ANDRIAS.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Building Labor’s Constitution

5/28/2016 1:19 PM

1595

The response of scholars who urge constitutional argumentation is that
workers should invoke the Constitution as a source of strength in the
political arena, without turning to courts.22 But the labor movement’s lived
experience is that even when workers direct their constitutional claims to
elected officials, courts often end up reviewing—and rejecting—their
validity.23 Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that the contemporary
labor movement avoids constitutional argumentation.
In short, the problem might not be so much a great forgetting, but an
acute remembering. Labor’s constitutional vision has been tested through
conflict and resoundingly rejected. In that context, constitutional arguments
hold little promise and have little purchase.
That does not mean, however, that the constitutional project need be
abandoned. One could imagine an alternative world in which constitutional
argumentation on behalf of labor’s goals would have more purchase—a
world in which the Constitution might be read to provide a right to a union
and collective bargaining, to decent wages and benefits, to basic dignity and
a measure of democracy at work. For that world to exist, however, more of
the citizenry—and more of the decision-making class—would have to be
favorably disposed toward those goals.
The fundamental political
commitments of the nation would have to shift along with the posture of the
judiciary.
In fact, low-wage worker campaigns like the Fight for $15 and the
Domestic Workers Alliance are attempting to bring about that shift.24 They
are seeking to change the nation’s basic commitments by making public
arguments, by enacting new laws, and by pushing for new regulatory
interpretations. Through legislative work, protests, strikes, and the use of
social media, they are seeking to persuade the public and elected officials of
the rightness of their demands and to enact their vision of labor rights.
They are engaging in “small-c” constitutionalism by attempting to change

22. See, e.g., Crain & Matheny, supra note 11, at 606 (arguing that “reframing labor rights as
assembly rights would offer modern unions and other worker advocacy groups a new rhetorical
tool in the struggle to win hearts and minds”); William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution
and Workers’ Rights, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115, 1156 (2011) [hereinafter Forbath, Distributive
Constitution] (arguing that “[w]e need to recall the progressive economic outlook on economic
life” in order to remind “lawmakers that there are constitutional stakes in attending seriously to the
economic needs of ordinary Americans”); William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in the
American Grain: Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020
55, 57 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) [hereinafter Forbath, American Grain]
(arguing that progressive counter narratives to the laissez-faire view of the Constitution can help
create political will to achieve legislative change).
23. See infra notes 115–25 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part IV.
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the web of practices, institutions, norms, and traditions that structure
American society.25
Such law reform and social change efforts are essential prerequisites to
the development of court-based constitutional labor rights. Without the
political and legal changes the movements urge, it is inconceivable that
common law courts—faithful to precedent, incremental in approach, and
drawn from the elite—will adopt the constitutional arguments that
progressive legal scholars urge. For this reason, defending and expanding
labor’s ongoing statutory and regulatory reform efforts may, for now at
least, be as important as any debate about whether or where in the
Constitution to lodge labor rights.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the
arguments for constitutional labor rights advanced by scholars but currently
unused by worker movements.
Part II elaborates the claim that
contemporary worker movements are not invoking the Constitution.
Part III argues that the movements’ relationship to courts and court-derived
constitutional law helps explain the silence. Part IV concludes by sketching
how the actual practice of today’s worker movements supports an
alternative way of approaching the construction of an “anti-oligarchy”
Constitution.
I.

The Case for Constitutional Labor Rights

Before proceeding, it is important to define more precisely what
constitutes “labor rights” and, relatedly, “constitutional labor rights.” By
most accounts, workplace law is divided into two main categories,
collective and individual, both of which function to protect workers and
both of which could potentially be constitutionally derived.26

25. See Primus, supra note 13, at 1082 (describing “small-c” constitutionalism and discussing
the diversity of small-c constitutional theories). For additional scholarship on the practice of
small-c constitutionalism and on how Americans have used statutory and administrative law to
construct constitutional meaning, see generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 20 (1991); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY ix–xi (2012); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
3–6, 69–73 (2011); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1–2 (2013); Karl N. Llewelyn, The Constitution as an
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American
Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–25 (2010); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution
Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 415–26 (2007); Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding
Informal Constitutional Change 1–2 (Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-1, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724580 [https://
perma.cc/FVN5-SBGJ] (considering a possible conflict between “small-c” and “big-C”
constitutionalism).
26. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685,
2701–03 (2008) (noting the conventional view that labor law and employment law are
dichotomous and contradictory modes of intervention into workplace governance); infra note 35
(collecting literature).
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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the primary statute that
governs collective labor relations in the private sector.27 In broad terms, it
“governs workers’ efforts to advance their own shared interests” through
self-organization and collective action.28 It protects, or purports to protect,
the right of private-sector workers to choose to bargain collectively with
their employers, to organize with other employees in unions or other
workplace associations, and to engage in peaceful “concerted activit[y]” by
withholding labor or by peacefully picketing.29 Many state laws, and some
state constitutions, provide similar protections for public-sector workers,30
though others restrict the extent of their employees’ collective labor rights.31
Individual employment rights are treated by a broad range of federal
and state employment laws, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Family and Medical Leave
Act.32
These operate independently of any collectivization in the
workplace.33 They protect the rights of workers to minimum standards and
fair treatment, including minimum wages, maximum hours, safe working
conditions, a modicum of unpaid leave, and other basic dignities at work.34

27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
28. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1527 (2002).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
30. Some state constitutions include a right to bargain collectively that covers public
employees. For example, the Florida Constitution states: “The right of employees, by and through
a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged.” FLA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 6.
31. See, e.g., Professional Educators Collaborative Conference Act of 2011, TENN. CODE
ANN. 49-5-603 (2012) (repealing a 1974 law that authorized collective bargaining for public
school teachers and permitting only “collaborative conferencing”); 2011 Wis. Act 10, §§ 210, 219,
2011 Wis. Legis. Serv. 23, 44–45 (West) (prohibiting government employers from collectively
bargaining with their general employees over anything except base wages; making it more
challenging for general-employee unions to obtain certification as exclusive bargaining agents;
and precluding general-employee unions from using automatic payroll deductions and fair-share
agreements).
32. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012); Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2012); Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012).
33. Sachs, supra note 26, at 2688.
34. For these purposes, I cabin off the problem of discrimination, addressed by a range of
federal and state statutes. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34
(2012) (dealing with discrimination based on age); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2012) (dealing with discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national
origin); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12113 (dealing with discrimination
based on disabilities). Of course, the division between employment law and employment
discrimination law is somewhat artificial. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (explaining that
employee civil rights, “some of them backed with private rights of action, are embedded within
many of the labor standards regimes”). But, in contrast to minimum entitlements and collective
labor rights, there is a developed line of constitutional law doctrine that tackles problems of
discrimination, at least in the public sector.
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Labor and employment law scholars dispute the extent to which the
two categories of rights, collective and individual, operate in tension with
one another, as well as whether the division makes conceptual sense.35
They also question whether the regime actually delivers on its promise to
protect workers’ rights in the contemporary economy—most scholars and
worker advocates believe it does not.36
But there is little dispute that Americans, at least in the private sector,
derive most of their workplace rights from statutes, not from the
Constitution. The Constitution guarantees neither a right to minimum
entitlements at work nor a right to strike or to bargain collectively.37 It
provides some protection for labor picketing, although less than is provided
for many other forms of protest.38 Indeed, some commentators have
referred to the field of labor as a constitutional “black hole.”39
Scholars at this Symposium and elsewhere have challenged various
aspects of the Court’s approach, arguing that the Constitution should be

35. For leading accounts of the tension between collective and individual rights, see, for
example, NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 141
(2003); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEXAS
L. REV. 1563, 1564–65 (1996); Estlund, supra note 34, at 326–55; Reuel E. Schiller, From Group
Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union
Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (1999); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of
Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal
Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 593, 637–38 (1992). For an account of
how the division between the categories breaks down, see Estlund, supra note 34, at 329; and
Sachs, supra note 26, at 2688–89.
36. The scholarship on this point is significant. Examples include: KATHERINE V.W. STONE,
FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE
(2004); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014); Brudney, supra note 35, at 1563–64;
Estlund, supra note 28, at 1596; Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983).
37. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Supreme Court gestured
toward a fundamental right to engage in union activity, but ultimately upheld the NLRA under
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 36–37. In subsequent years, the Court recognized
a constitutional right to join a union in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 533–34 (1945), but not a
right to bargain or to process grievances through a union in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway
Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464–65 (1979). See also United Fed’n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325
F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.D.C. 1971) (emphasizing that there is no constitutional right to strike), aff’d
404 U.S. 802 (1971).
38. E.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 294–95 (1957)
(allowing state court to enjoin peaceful labor picketing on ground that purpose was coercive and
therefore contrary to public policy); see also Alan Hyde, Exclusion Is Forever: How Keeping
Labor Rights Separate from Constitutional Rights Has Proven to be a Bad Deal for American
Trade Unions and Constitutional Law, 15 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 251, 255 (2009–2010)
(showing how union picketing is uniquely disfavored).
39. James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65
TEXAS L. REV. 1071, 1074–76 (1987); cf. Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional
Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 177–78 (2015) (arguing that unions are distinct in our legal
system and subject to a quid pro quo that both constrains and empowers them in ways that form an
essential context for adjudicating related constitutional claims).
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understood to speak to problems of economic welfare and concentrations of
private power generally40, and to problems of labor in particular.
With respect to labor, several theories are available. At a high level of
generality, the argument runs, labor rights advance “bedrock constitutional
values” such as “equal liberty and respect, dignity, freedom of expression
and association, and republican self-rule.”41
Labor rights are key
mechanisms to redress “economic inequality, domination, and
dependency.”42 They are a prerequisite to the democratic and egalitarian
society promised, or at least anticipated, by the Constitution.43 On this
account, provisions in the Constitution that grant Congress power to protect
civil rights and civil liberties should be interpreted to provide the capacity
to guarantee labor rights, and courts should construe statutes to avoid
conflict with the fundamental labor rights commitments of the
Constitution.44
More formal constitutional law arguments exist as well. A starting
point is the First Amendment. For example, the Court could easily
invalidate state and federal restraints on labor protest, aligning labor-

40. See generally BALKIN, supra note 25, at 240–44, 251–52; Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres
and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimum Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37–
43 (1990); Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1104–17 (1986); Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival:
Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623–31 (1988); Peter B. Edelman, The Next
Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1977); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334–35 (2006); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of
Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962,
963, 966–67 (1973) [hereinafter Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights]; Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9–12 (1969) [hereinafter Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term—Foreword]. For recent work by scholars who seek to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect the poor, see generally Ross & Li, supra note 10, at 327, 341–82 (assessing
the political power of the poor and critiquing the Court’s holdings that the poor are not a suspect
class); and Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 1531–33, 1535, 1577–79 (proposing a new
definition of “political powerlessness” for purposes of equal protection doctrine and arguing,
based on that definition, that the poor have a compelling claim to suspect status).
41. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 22, at 1119; see also id. at 1118 (“[G]ross
economic inequality produces gross political inequality. You cannot have a constitutional
republic, or what the Framers called a ‘republican form of government,’ and certainly not a
constitutional democracy, in the context of gross material inequality among citizens. . . .”).
42. Id. at 1119; Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy,
Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. &
SOC’Y 152, 179–80 (2010).
43. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 22, at 1118.
44. See generally Fishkin & Forbath, Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, supra note 8, at 670–72;
Fishkin & Forbath, Great Society, supra note 8, at 1020–23.

ANDRIAS.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1600

5/28/2016 1:19 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 94:1591

picketing doctrine with other areas of free speech law.45 Or, in a more
significant departure from precedent, the Court could interpret the First
Amendment’s speech and assembly clauses to give employees greater rights
in organizing campaigns, boycotts, and strikes, or at least to authorize
Congress and regulators to balance those rights with employer rights.46
There are historical antecedents for understanding labor rights to be
protected under the First Amendment. Laura Weinrib has shown that, at the
time of the New Deal, civil libertarians considered unions to be essential
prerequisites to the freedom of speech, press, and assembly.47 Congress,
after passing the NLRA, made clear that it too understood the rights to
organize and bargain collectively as First Amendment rights.48 Even the
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion in Hague v. CIO,49 concluded that it
is a “privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States” to discuss the
“full freedom of association and self-organization of workers” conferred by
the NLRA.50
Others have suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment is the “natural
starting point in the search for a constitutional theory of labor liberty.”51
That Amendment, after all, is the sole constitutional provision that directly
addresses labor relations; it also stands out as the sole rights provision that

45. Pope, supra note 39, at 1090; see also Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest
Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 281 (2015) (arguing for
changes to labor-picketing doctrine).
46. See Marion Crain & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1791, 1798–
805 (arguing that freedom of assembly should be a source of legal protections for labor unions and
worker advocacy efforts); Crain & Matheny, supra note 11, at 606 (same); Charlotte Garden,
Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 17 (2011) [hereinafter Garden, Citizens United] (arguing that recent First Amendment
doctrine in campaign finance context calls into question the validity of cases limiting protections
for labor speech); Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why Union
Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2620 (2011)
[hereinafter Garden, Labor Values] (arguing that labor speech should receive heightened First
Amendment scrutiny); Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in
Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2421–25 & n.19 (2003) (urging greater
consideration of the speech rights of employees in organizing campaigns).
47. Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 326–30;
see also Pope, supra note 39, at 1090 (reporting that civil libertarians in this era regarded striking
and picketing as exercises of basic civil rights).
48. See Weinrib, supra note 47, at 332 (describing Congress’s decision to authorize the
investigation of violations of free speech and assembly rights and “undue interference with the
right of labor to organize and bargain collectively” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
50. Id. at 512–13; see also Weinrib, supra note 47, at 398 (discussing the plurality opinion in
Hague).
51. Pope, supra note 39, at 1096; see also James Gray Pope, What’s Different About the
Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189, 189 (2012) [hereinafter
Pope, What’s Different].
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explicitly protects against private concentrations of power.52 As Lea
VanderVelde and Eric Foner have documented, there is at least some
evidence that the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment intended the ban on
involuntary servitude to provide meaningful protections for worker
autonomy.53 Consistent with that view, the Supreme Court, in striking
down peonage laws, has recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches
not only emancipated African-Americans, but also mandates a “basic
system of free labor”54 for all persons of “whatever race, color, or estate.”55
Though the Court has not, outside of the peonage context, used the
Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of “free labor” to protect collective or
individual labor rights,56 earlier social movements and political actors have.
James Gray Pope has shown that the Thirteenth Amendment was a tool of
pre-New Deal-era unionists who sought to ground the right to unionize in a
theory of free labor.57 Risa Goluboff has documented how lawyers in the
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division invoked the Thirteenth

52. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436–37 (1968) (recognizing the
Thirteenth Amendment’s reach to private discrimination); Pope, What’s Different, supra note 51,
at 189 (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment stands out as the sole rights guarantee that protects not only
against government, but also against private concentrations of power . . . .”).
53. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 40–69 (1995); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438, 472–74 (1989). But cf. Pamela Brandwein,
The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, Revisited, GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming
2017) (arguing that the free labor vision embraced an equal right to a contracted or market wage
but not a right to a minimum or living wage).
54. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17, 25 (1944) (striking down a Florida peonage law and
setting forth its most extensive justification for protecting the inalienable right to quit work under
the Thirteenth Amendment). In Pollock, the Court wrote:
[I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or
treatment is the right to change employers. When the master can compel and the
laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and
no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of
work.
Id. at 18.
55. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241, 245 (1911) (striking down Alabama’s debt
peonage law); see also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (stating that the Thirteenth
Amendment reaches “every race and every individual”), overruled on other grounds by Jones, 392
U.S. at 441 n.78.
56. James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of
“Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1478–79 (2010).
57. E.g., James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor
and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12–25
(2002) (discussing the pre-New Deal labor movement’s use of the Thirteenth Amendment to
justify the constitutionality of prolabor legislation); see also James Gray Pope, Labor’s
Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 943 (1997) [hereinafter Pope, Labor’s Constitution]
(describing labor’s freedom constitution and analyzing it as a form of constitutional insurgency).
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Amendment beginning in the 1940s to oppose forms of economic coercion
beyond peonage.58
Scholars have also marshaled the Fourteenth Amendment in favor of
labor rights. The Equal Protection and Due Process clauses could be read
to provide rights to minimum economic entitlements, including decent
wages and a measure of democracy at work.59 Here, again, there is
historical precedent. The pre-New Deal labor movement understood the
Fourteenth Amendment, along with the First and Thirteenth Amendments
and the Constitution’s commitment to Republican Government, to protect
rights to associate, assemble, and unionize, and to ensure certain minimum
economic rights at work.60 Though these constitutional claims were
repeatedly spurned by the courts, labor brought them again and again to
Congress and state legislatures.61
In short, legal historians have demonstrated that arguments for
constitutional labor rights now dismissed by lawyers and judges as lacking
foundation were once plausible. And legal theorists have offered several
cogent blueprints “for a broad conception of social and economic
citizenship” or a right of “free labor” encompassing decent work and a
measure of economic democracy.62

58. See Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1647–68 (2001) (discussing how the 1940s Department of Justice lawyers
improvised within available constitutional and statutory language, and expanded the meaning and
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment to reach other impediments to free labor).
59. For scholarship urging such interpretation, see generally Karst, supra note 40; Liu, supra
note 40; Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 40; Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword, supra note 40. Cynthia Estlund has also urged a due
process framework, in the form of a “just cause” requirement for discharge and a fair hearing.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 104 (1995);
see also Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First Amendment to
Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1463–64 (2007).
60. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 59 (1999).
61. Id. at 59; see also id. at 60.
62. William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (1994)
(reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)). Several foreign legal
systems have interpreted similar constitutional provisions to provide labor rights. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Scott et al., How Does the Law Put an Analogy to Work? Discerning ‘A Condition
Analogous to That of a Slave’ in Contemporary Brazil (May 2, 2016) (working paper) (on file
with author) (discussing Brazil’s efforts to identify and prosecute cases of contemporary slavery);
see also Health Servs. & Support, Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. British Columbia,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, 393 (Can.) (holding that the right to freedom of association in the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms included the right to collective bargaining). But cf. Alan Bogg & Keith
Ewing, A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in the Supreme Court of Canada, 33
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 379, 379 (2012) (discussing the Canadian Supreme Court’s subsequent
partial retreat). The comparative question of why some legal and constitutional regimes have been
more sympathetic to labor rights is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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The Contemporary Absence of Constitutional Claims

Still, not even the most optimistic supporters of constitutional labor
rights believe the current Supreme Court will embrace a labor-rights or antioligarchy vision of the Constitution. They are right. When the more liberal
members of the current Court offer a defense of union rights or wage and
hour laws, they rely almost entirely on stare decisis and legislative or
administrative prerogative, rather than on any argument that the
Constitution protects labor rights.63 And no member of the current Court
has embraced the idea that the Constitution should be understood to require
the provision of basic economic entitlements.64
For this reason, the immediate audience for constitutionalizing labor
rights lies outside the courts. Scholars direct their arguments to fellow
academics and students—tomorrow’s judges, perhaps.65 They also write for
existing social movements and political actors—those who seek to bring
about an alternative regime that guarantees a more equitable distribution of
resources and political power.66 Social movements, constitutional optimists
urge, can gain traction by placing their demands within a constitutional
register, by arguing that the Constitution inspires, and perhaps compels,
their political objectives.67 Ultimately, they can help bring into being the
understanding that judges will later read into the text of the Constitution.68
Yet, despite the efforts of scholars, contemporary, on-the-ground
worker movements are not making constitutional arguments in any explicit
or sustained way. Consider again the Fight for $15. Over the course of the

63. See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2645 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I begin
where this case should also end—with this Court’s decision in Abood.”).
64. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Address
at the University of Michigan, Tanner Lecture on Human Values (Feb. 6, 2015).
65. Forbath, supra note 62, at 1772.
66. See, e.g., id. at 1772–74 (urging greater reliance on constitutional politics, in place of
constitutional adjudication, to advance a vision of equal citizenship); Robin West, The Missing
Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 22, at 79
(“I will suggest that progressive lawyers should take this opportunity of their respite from judicial
power and attend to the development of that Constitution, so that we might at some point in the
future urge fidelity to it on the part of our representatives, rather than continue to attend, with the
same intense devotion that still characterizes our current legal zeitgeist, to the adjudicated
Constitution.”).
67. E.g., Crain & Matheny, supra note 11, at 606; Forbath, American Grain, supra note 22, at
55, 57; Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 22, at 118.
68. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2006)
(examining the aftermath of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) defeat and showing how
constitutional culture channels social movement conflict to produce enforceable constitutional
understandings); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution From a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 312–13 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Text in
Contest] (demonstrating that “[c]laims on the text of the Constitution made by mobilized groups
of Americans outside the courthouse helped bring into being the understandings that judges then
read into the text of the Constitution”).
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past several years, low-wage workers in fast food and retail, organized
primarily by the Service Employees International Union, have participated
in a series of intermittent strikes and protests.69 They are calling for a base
wage of fifteen dollars an hour and the right to form a union.70 The
movement has had significant success since it began a few years ago. It has
focused attention on the plight of low-wage workers and has succeeded in
winning new minimum wage statutes from a number of state and local
governments across the country.71
The claims made by the Fight for $15 are rights based: workers are
demanding a living wage and union rights as fundamental entitlements.72
Yet constitutional arguments barely register.73 On social media, in press
releases, on picket lines, and in litigation documents, the workers frame
their demands as about dignity and respect, or about human or civil rights,74
but with rare exception, they do not invoke the Constitution or its particular
provisions.75
The Domestic Workers Alliance provides another example of a
contemporary low-wage worker movement not making explicit
constitutional claims. It is made up of over fifty local affiliates.76 The
Domestic Workers Alliance has won, in several localities, new laws that set
minimum standards in the domestic work industry.77 Though the

69. See, e.g., Jenny Brown, Fast Food Strikes: What’s Cooking?, LABORNOTES (June 24,
2013), http://www.labornotes.org/2013/06/fast-food-strikes-whats-cooking [https://perma.cc/
B53L-LZKZ]; Steven Greenhouse, Hundreds of Fast-Food Workers Striking for Higher Wages
Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/business/
economy/fast-food-workers-seeking-higher-wages-are-arrested-during-sit-ins.html
[https://perma.cc/E8NE-BC2Q].
70. Brown, supra note 69.
71. Brendan McDermid, New Year Brings Minimum Wage Hikes for Americans in 14 States,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 1, 2016, 12:59 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-year-brings-minimum
-wage-hikes-americans-14-states-410854 [https://perma.cc/9TWU-BCW4].
72. Id.
73. See Forbath, American Grain, supra note 22, at 56 (“Today, however, with the important
exception of employment discrimination, work, livelihoods, social provision, and the material
bases of citizenship have vanished from the constitutional landscape.”); see also @fightfor15,
TWITTER https://twitter.com/fightfor15?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr
%5Eauthor [https://perma.cc/KY5V-3TRT] (emphasizing respect and dignity throughout the
Twitter campaign, but bearing virtually no mention of the Constitution).
74. See generally @fightfor15, supra note 73; Fight for $15, When You Can’t Even Afford
Bus Fare to Get to Work the Economy is Broken, FACEBOOK (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/Fightfor15/photos/pb.580610428636345.-2207520000.1448922360./
1060044294026287/?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/XC6Z-8HSC].
75. See @fightfor15, supra note 73.
76. NDWA Member Organizations, NAT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED, http://www
.domesticworkersunited.org/index.php/en/ [https://perma.cc/DJN4-U33T].
77. The new laws guarantee privately employed nannies, housekeepers, and elder caregivers
at least a day of rest per week, at least three days of rest per year after the first year of
employment, and overtime at the regular rate of pay for live-in workers; they also set a day’s work
at eight hours, provide minimum wage coverage for companions of the sick and elderly, and
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movement frames its legislative demands as “bills of rights”, it has not
located them within the American constitutional tradition.78
The same is true of other contemporary low-wage worker campaigns,
such as Our WalMart, a campaign to improve conditions at WalMart;79
Warehouse Workers United, a nonprofit dedicated to improving working
conditions in the warehouse industry in Southern California;80 the
Restaurant Opportunities Center United, an organization dedicated to
improving wages and working conditions for the nation’s restaurant
workforce;81 and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, a worker-based
human rights organization focused on the agricultural industry and tomatoes
in particular.82 Occasionally these campaigns invoke the freedom of speech
or the right to associate, but they do not appeal to the Constitution in any
consistent or systematic way.83
The notable lack of appeal to the Constitution as a source of rights
stands in contrast not only to previous incarnations of the labor, civil rights,
and women’s movements,84 but also to contemporary social movements on
both the Right and Left. The Tea Party, gun rights advocates, and the right-

provide protection to domestic workers from discrimination and harassment. See Domestic
Worker’s Bill of Rights, ch. 481, 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1315 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. EXEC.
LAW §§ 292, 296-b (McKinney 2014)).
78. E.g., Albor Ruiz, Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Law Finally Grants Protection for
Over 200,000 People, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 10, 2010, 4:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/domestic-workers-bill-rights-law-finally-grantsprotection-200-000-people-article-1.439548 [https://perma.cc/CS8P-JMMU]; see also Campaigns,
NAT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://www.domesticworkersunited.org/index.php/en/
our-work/campaigns [https://perma.cc/7ZLL-F8WL]; Illinois Bill of Rights, NAT’L DOMESTIC
WORKERS ALLIANCE (May 11, 2016), http://www.domesticworkers.org/illinois-bill-of-rights
[https://perma.cc/LU5T-5E6T].
79. OUR WALMART, http://forrespect.org/ [https://perma.cc/H5QS-7ZAW].
80. WAREHOUSE WORKER RESOURCE CTR., http://www.warehouseworkers.org [https://
perma.cc/9QEL-3F9Y].
81. ROCUNITED, http://rocunited.org [https://perma.cc/2U3A-9H32].
82. COALITION IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://www.ciw-online.org [https://perma.cc/NL3REBGN]. A conservative organization tracking the activity of worker associations identifies the
above groups as the most active. See WORKER CTR. WATCH, http://workercenterwatch.com/
worker-centers/ [https://perma.cc/FS78-N879].
83. For a rare example of invocation of constitutional language, see Declaration for Respect,
OUR
WALMART,
http://forrespect.org/the-declaration/
[https://perma.cc/9RCQ-JXHL],
emphasizing freedom of association, freedom of speech, and equality, among other goals.
84. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1000–02 (1989) (discussing the Civil Rights
Movement’s invocation of constitutional rights); Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 57, at
958–66 (outlining earlier labor movements’ invocations of the Constitution); Reva B. Siegel, She
the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 947, 951 (2002) (describing suffragists’ constitutional arguments for sex equality); see also
Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?,
Speech Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland (Mar. 26, 1860), in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467–80 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950) (appealing to the Constitution as an
antislavery document prior to the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment).

ANDRIAS.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1606

5/28/2016 1:19 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 94:1591

to-life movement have all laid claim to the Constitution—and they did so
even before their arguments had footholds in the doctrine.85 So too the gay
rights and reproductive rights movements invoked the Constitution even
before their claims persuaded courts.86 Over time, after litigation and
political struggle, the Supreme Court has come to accept, to different
extents, the alternative constitutional visions offered by these movements.87
Fishkin and Forbath attribute the absence of constitutional
argumentation about economic inequality as a “Great Forgetting.”88 They
mine a rich history of earlier constitutional claims and urge contemporary
actors to recall that history and to draw on it.89 But today’s worker
movements are led by experienced organizers, researchers, and lawyers.
Many are aware of the power of constitutional rhetoric, some are familiar
with the labor movement’s own constitutional history, and a number have
worked in other movements that rely on constitutional argumentation.90 So
too many of the worker–participants are undoubtedly familiar with highlevel constitutional principles such as the promise of equal protection and

85. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE
REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 48–50 (2012) (explaining how the Tea Party uses the
Constitution to further its agenda); Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813, 814,
819 (2014) (discussing the use of constitutional rhetoric by the gun rights movement); Mary
Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 871 (discussing the history of
antiabortion constitutionalism); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 554–74 (2006) (describing
the use of originalism by a range of political actors).
86. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419,
1432–35, 1485–1511 (1993) (arguing that marriage is a socially constructed institution and
constructing arguments in support of gay marriage by reinterpreting tradition); Reva B. Siegel,
Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1875–79
(2010) (discussing feminist constitutional arguments in support of abortion in the years before
Roe); see also Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 68, at 303 (distinguishing “constitutional
culture” from constitutional “lawmaking” and discussing periods of constitutional mobilization).
87. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603–04 (2015) (adopting, in part, the
gay rights movement’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (adopting, in part, the gun rights movement’s view of the Second
Amendment); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (adopting argument of the right-tolife movement that “respect for the dignity of human life” provides a ground for governmental
restrictions on abortion).
88. FISHKIN & FORBATH, ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION, supra note 8 (manuscript at 7).
89. Id. (manuscript at 7, 12–13).
90. The General Counsel of the AFL-CIO, for example, was previously a professor of labor
law and has published on issues of labor and the Constitution. See, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy
in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV.
495, 503 (1993) (explaining how the American Federation of Labor defended the Wagner Act’s
constitutionality “not on the basis of the federal government’s power to regulate interstate
commerce, . . . but rather on the basis of Article IV, section 4 of the United States Constitution,
which guarantees that every state shall have ‘a republican form of government’”). The founder of
the Restaurant Opportunities Center United, Saru Jayaraman, is a Yale Law School graduate who
has studied and written about labor history. See Saru Jayaraman, UC BERKELEY LAB. CTR.,
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/author/saru-jayaraman/ [https://perma.cc/3MZR-87FX].
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right to free speech.91 A lack of memory thus would seem to be an
insufficient explanation for the absence of constitutional claims.
III. Labor and Courts—or Labor’s Long Memory
To understand why labor may be reluctant to embrace a constitutional
strategy, one must consider the movement’s relationship to courts. Scholars
emphasize the importance of “the constitution outside the courts,” and a
non-juridical constitution clearly does exist.92
Our Constitution is
prominent in public discourse, and its relatively brief text is accessible to a
general audience.93
Actors throughout the government engage in
constitutional interpretation,94 as do popular movements.95 And courts are
often responsive to popular sentiment regarding the Constitution.96

91. See STEVE FARKAS ET AL., NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., KNOWING IT BY HEART:
AMERICANS CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS MEANING 14 (2002) http://www
.publicagenda.org/files/knowing_by_heart.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q85-7U2L] (finding that while
most Americans “have a hazy recall of the specifics, the vast majority have absorbed the basic
principles of the Constitution and convey broad acceptance of them”); cf. Nathaniel Persily,
Introduction, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 8, 10–15 (Nathaniel
Persily et al. eds., 2008) (examining how popular opinion responds to the Supreme Court’s
constitutional rulings and concluding that in some cases, though not most, public attitudes shift in
response).
92. For scholars urging popular and legislative constitutionalism, see NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS
FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, at ix (2d ed. 2015); FISHKIN & FORBATH, ANTIOLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION, supra note 8 (manuscript at passim); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194 (1999); Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1027, 1043 (2004); West, supra note 66, at 79; see also SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988) (describing “constitutional protestantism”—the idea that no
institution of government, including the Supreme Court, has a monopoly on the meaning of the
Constitution); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983) (positing that a wide variety of social groups are capable
of generating legal meaning).
93. See Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 672, 676, 681 (2002) (arguing that
“the federal Constitution was designed to be an open and inviting textual edifice,” “a short
document that every citizen could read, understand, and in various ways . . . help interpret” and
noting that it “does its work in less than 8000 words” whereas “the average state constitution
today sprawls out over some 30,000 words”); cf. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining
Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 769, 830 & n.168 (2012)
(describing the “sheer brevity” of the U.S. Constitution and noting the length of the Indian
Constitution, among others).
94. For descriptions of executive, legislative, and administrative constitutionalism, as well as
defenses of them, see generally Michael Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional
Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1335–36 (2001) (discussing legislative constitutionalism);
Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace,
1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 799–801 (2010) (discussing administrative
constitutionalism); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1897,
1897–1900 (2013) (discussing administrative constitutionalism); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 227 (1994)
(discussing executive constitutionalism); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the
Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 676 (2005) (same).
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Nonetheless, as scholars have documented, courts today play an
outsized role in defining the scope and content of the Constitution,
particularly its rights provisions.97 Indeed, under current doctrine the
Supreme Court itself contends that defining constitutional rights generally,
and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in particular, is the exclusive
responsibility of the Supreme Court.98 As recently as 2012, in Coleman v.
Maryland,99 the Court reiterated that Congress may not decree the substance
of constitutional rights.100
The Court’s insistence on judicial supremacy over constitutional
decision making is not without consequence.101 In practice, legal education
frequently equates constitutional meaning to court interpretation. Even
when professors emphasize the existence of popular, executive, and
legislative constitutionalism, constitutional law courses are structured
around judicial decisions.102 And while movement actors and elected
officials frequently contest Supreme Court decisions and seek to change
them, most concede the authority of the Court to say what the Constitution
95. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (discussing the attempted use of
constitutional arguments during the pre-New Deal period).
96. Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2599–
2612 (2003); see also JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 70–71 (2011)
(discussing “constitutional catholicism”—the view that the courts are the central authority in
interpreting the Constitution).
97. See Amar, supra note 93, at 681 (noting the Court’s willingness to ignore the Constitution
itself in favor of judicial precedent); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of
the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
300 (2002) (exploring “how the Court’s inflated opinion of its own interpretive powers has
influenced its treatment of Congress’s constitutional judgments in cases in which the Court plainly
has jurisdiction,” and explaining “how this same view has bled into the Court’s evaluation of its
own jurisdictional limits”); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2001) (“The last, faint traces of popular constitutionalism are
fading, threatened by a Court that truly sees the Constitution as nothing more than ordinary law.”);
cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 412–13 (2012) (showing how historical practice of the political branches
plays an important role in controversies relating to the separation of powers).
98. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–19 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519 (1997); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
99. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
100. See id. at 1337 (holding that Congress did not validly abrogate states’ sovereign
immunity from suits for money damages in enacting the FMLA’s self-care provision).
101. See TUSHNET, supra note 92, at 7 (arguing that the current system of judicial review and
judicial supremacy over constitutional decision making leaves scant room for citizen
participation); Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959,
963–64 (2004) (arguing that, since the 1980s, judicial supremacy seems to have “become the
norm,” and bemoaning the diminution of popular constitutionalism); cf. Post & Siegel, supra note
85, at 1043 (noting that a general decline in political involvement could help explain a decline in
popular engagement with the Constitution).
102. The leading constitutional law textbooks, organized almost entirely around Supreme
Court cases, illustrate the point. E.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th
ed. 2013); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (18th ed. 2013).
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means—at least in particular cases.103 In light of this background, one
cannot consider the possibility of constitutional labor rights without
considering labor’s relationship to courts.
A.

Court Antagonism to Labor Rights

Courts and legal elites have been unfriendly to demands of various
social movements,104 but the history of court antagonism toward workers is
particularly long and storied. In the years following the Civil War, workers
organized by the Knights of Labor suffered extraordinary and violent
repression, frequently sanctioned by courts.105 So too at the turn of the
century, when the American Federation of Labor was the dominant labor
organization and the Congressional Industrial Organization (CIO) was
emerging, courts continued to intervene against workers’ collective
action.106 They used conspiracy and antitrust law, even after Congress
attempted to foreclose application of those doctrines to labor.107 At the
same time, courts struck down a host of protective labor legislation by
invoking liberty of contract and a narrow understanding of congressional
power.108 By one count, at least 4,300 injunctions were issued against
union activity between 1880 and 1930,109 and hundreds of statutes were
invalidated.110
As William Forbath has shown, the effects of court sanction were
significant, shaping the policy demands the labor movement would make in
the future.111 The courts’ power to exercise judicial review over labor
legislation diminished the appeal of broad legal reforms.112 Likewise, the
103. See Post & Siegel, supra note 85, at 1036 (explaining that Americans “have generally
been committed both to judicially enforceable constitutional rights and to the idea that the
Constitution reflects the political self-conception of the nation”).
104. See infra subpart III(B) (discussing how social movement demands can be incompatible
with court-focused constitutional litigation).
105. See generally CHRIS TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 11–59 (1985) (discussing
the role of legal institutions in the development of the labor movement); Forbath, Shaping
American Labor, supra note 18, at 1185–95 (discussing legally sanctioned violence against labor
protestors).
106. Forbath, Shaping American Labor, supra note 18, at 1220–21.
107. Id. (describing how courts swept aside the laws limiting conspiracy and antitrust doctrine
as “irresponsible and ill-considered legislative tinkering with a realm of law that belonged by right
to the judiciary”).
108. Id.
109. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 183 (2001)
[hereinafter Forbath, Constitution in Exile]; Forbath, Shaping American Labor, supra note 18, at
1249–52 (estimating the number of injunctions).
110. Forbath, Shaping American Labor, supra note 18, at 1133 n.78, 1237 (categorizing
legislation and tracking court response); see id. at 1133 (“During the 1880’s and 1890’s courts
were far more likely than not to strike down the very laws that labor sought most avidly.”).
111. Id. at 1116.
112. Id.
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courts’ “harshly repressive law of industrial conflict helped make broad,
inclusive unionism seem too costly and a more cautious, narrower unionism
essential.”113
Court hostility to labor also changed trade unionists’ views of what
was possible and desirable under the Constitution. During the pre-New
Deal period, labor advocates addressed their First, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims to Congress, rather than the Court, out of
distrust of judges.114 But locating labor rights in statutes proved to be
insufficient to shield labor from court sanction.115
The fall of Lochner116 is widely heralded as ushering in a constitutional
settlement.117 Holmes’s view won out: economic theory would be left to
the democratic process.118 Yet, for the labor movement, that settlement was
short-lived and only partial. Within just a few years of the fall of Lochner,
employers had successfully reframed their liberty arguments as First
Amendment and property-rights arguments.119 By the time Congress
passed the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947, widely considered to be an antilabor
bill,120 the Supreme Court had already significantly narrowed the original
Wagner Act.121 In subsequent years, it continued to weaken protections for
workers’ concerted action in favor of managerial rights of control and
employers’ and nonunion workers’ First Amendment interests.122

113. Id. Forbath contrasts the American experience with the British, where judicial review
was less prominent. William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England
and America: A Study of the Constitutive Power of Law, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 1–5 (1991).
114. Forbath, Constitution in Exile, supra note 109, at 179.
115. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268–70 (1978) (describing the
impact of Supreme Court decisions on the Wagner Act).
116. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
117. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987)
(describing how the Court and scholars have subsequently understood the fall of Lochner to
represent the need for judicial deference to legislative enactments).
118. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For the leading scholarly account
that Lochner was wrong because it represented an illegitimate intrusion by courts into an area
reserved to the political branches of government, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980).
119. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945); NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); Andrias, supra note 46, at 2421–25 & n.19.
120. See Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft–Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763,
763–65 (1998) (reviewing debate about whether Taft–Hartley codified existing antilabor positions
or was a turning point for further restricting unions).
121. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN LABOR LAW 47 (1983); Klare,
supra note 115, at 265–68.
122. See ATLESON, supra note 121, at 59–66, 106–07 (describing how courts imported
notions of managerial rights to narrow protections under the NLRA); SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE
WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 233–37 (2014)
(discussing how the Court came to enshrine in the First Amendment the right of objecting workers
not to pay union fees); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46
STAN. L. REV. 305, 308 (1994) [hereinafter Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty]
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Meanwhile, in interpreting the NLRA and applicable state law, the Court all
but withdrew constitutional protection from certain forms of private-sector
labor picketing and protest.123
Public-sector employees fared no better. There, unlike in the private
sector, workers indisputably could claim constitutional rights—their
employers were state actors.124 Yet, courts carved out exceptions from
generally applicable First Amendment doctrine, leaving public employees
with comparatively few speech rights.125
More recently, labor cases have proved fertile ground for the
development of corporate-protective First Amendment doctrine. A recent
D.C. Circuit decision went so far as to conclude that requiring employers to
post the basic contours of labor law constituted unconstitutional compelled
speech.126 Though that opinion was subsequently overruled by an en banc
decision in another case, its holding continues to command support from
several judges on the court.127
In recent years, courts have also allowed conspiracy statutes to be
deployed against collective action by workers in surprising ways. For
example, courts have entertained actions brought by employers under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); these suits
aim to stop unions from waging public campaigns that expose bad business
practices in an effort to win unionization rights.128 The threat of such RICO
suits has led unions to drop some of their public campaigns.129
(concluding that the Court allowed a “naked property right to trump the substantial statutory
interests of organized employees”); Schiller, supra note 35, at 57–72 (detailing how courts came
to privilege individual liberties over union rights).
123. NLRB v. Retail Store Emp. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (maintaining that the picketing restriction at issue was consistent with the First
Amendment); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957)
(concluding that picketing, even though peaceful, could be enjoined by state courts). For a
summary of the Court’s jurisprudence on labor picketing and strikes, see Garden, Citizens United,
supra note 46, at 17–26.
124. See Cynthia Estlund, How the Workplace Constitution Ties Liberals and Conservatives
in Knots, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2015) (reviewing LEE, supra note 122) (explaining that,
in contrast to the public sector, the private-sector workforce lacks constitutional protection
because nearly all of Americans’ federal constitutional rights run only against state action, not
against purely private infringement).
125. Richard Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights
Are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 729, 731–32 (1989) (arguing that when constitutional
rights norms confront labor relations, the constitutional norms almost invariably give way).
126. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part by
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (American Meat), 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
127. American Meat, 760 F.3d at 36–37 (Henderson, J., dissenting); id. at 37 (Brown, J.,
dissenting); cf. id. at 30–33 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasizing expansive protections owed
to commercial speakers notwithstanding his concurrence in American Meat).
128. See, e.g., Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 585
F. Supp. 2d 789, 806 (E.D. Va. 2008) (rejecting unions’ First Amendment defense to a RICO
lawsuit stemming out of the unions’ legislative and regulatory activity). For discussion of the use
of RICO against unions, see James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO
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The Normative Mismatch

The hesitancy of the labor movement to embrace formal constitutional
arguments, however, cannot be explained simply by particular judges’
hostility to labor rights. A more fundamental normative problem presents
as well: court-defined rights, as they exist in the modern American
tradition, are in substantial tension with the commitments and goals of the
labor movement.
Scholars have identified several reasons why court-derived rights can
be problematic vehicles for progressive social change.130 First, according to
this well-developed critique, constitutional rights tend to protect preexisting property and contract rights to shield existing entitlements against
political encroachment.131 Thus, even progressive gains, when achieved via
courts, have often entrenched current distributions of power.132 Second,
because of the state action doctrine, court-generated rights have tended to
reinforce a sharp distinction between the public and private spheres of
life.133 The notion of a private realm of freedom against which the
Constitution does not intervene, versus a public realm of coercion from
which the Constitution offers protection, is of limited use to those who hope
to challenge private concentrations of power.134 Relatedly, court-derived
rights in the American tradition have, for the most part, been limited to
negative rights; the Constitution is not currently thought to mandate
affirmative government action to guarantee fundamental rights.135 Third,
Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 733 (2010);
Garden, Labor Values, supra note 46, at 2623–32.
129. Garden, Labor Values, supra note 46, at 2623–26 (discussing RICO lawsuits); Josh
Eidelson, That’s RICO, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 30, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/thats-rico
[https://perma.cc/B4SL-SQ3B].
130. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1412–13 (2009) [hereinafter West, De-Constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights] (summarizing and analyzing literature); see also LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON
CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 5 (2012); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for
Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1862 (1987); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the
Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 369–74 (2012); Robin L. West,
The Aspirational Constitution, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 241, 241–46 (1993); Robin L. West, Tragic
Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 714–15, 719–21
(2011).
131. See West, De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, supra note 130, at 1413–14
(describing scholarship criticizing the tendency of courts to protect the interests, privileges, and
entitlements of property owners).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the
Constitution “is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties”); David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (concluding that, with some
limited exceptions, the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties). Scholars have critiqued the
distinction between positive and negative rights and have argued for finding positive rights in the
Constitution. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 36–39
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court-derived rights under our Constitution have tended to be individualistic
in nature.136 Finally, constitutional adjudication tends to strive for
consistency with past practice and precedent.137 As a result, progressive
victories achieved through the courts are inherently limited.138
None of these qualities of court-derived rights are intrinsic to
constitutional law; all could be changed. But they are all deeply rooted in
doctrine. And for labor, each presents a significant challenge.
Long after Lochner, labor rights have continued to run headlong into
employers’ common law rights of property and contract. For example,
courts have repeatedly concluded that employees’ statutory rights to engage
in concerted action—to meet with union organizers on employer property
or to organize without threat of plant closure—must give way to employers’
property and managerial rights.139 The state action doctrine is also a
significant bar to constitutional labor rights. Recognizing as constitutional
the right of private-sector workers not to be permanently replaced during a
strike or not to be forced to attend employer-mandated captive audience
meetings during a union campaign would require a softening, if not a
repudiation, of the state action doctrine that insulates most private actors
from constitutional attack.140 Meanwhile, demands for minimum standards
of employment as a matter of right rest on a rejection of the negative–
positive rights distinction that characterizes the contemporary
understanding of rights.141 Finally, more robust constitutional protection for

(1999) (describing the attempt to frame a dichotomy between negative and positive rights as
futile); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2278–79
(1990) (arguing that the conventional wisdom distinguishing government action from inaction is
flawed). But see Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 923–24
(2001) (concluding that judicial enforcement of positive rights would be counterproductive).
136. See Schiller, supra note 35, at 4, 57–72 (showing how courts came to privilege rights of
individuals over the rights of organized groups); John Fabian Witt, Crystal Eastman and the
Internationalist Beginnings of American Civil Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 720 (2004) (describing
failed efforts of Progressive-Era intellectuals to direct public discourse away from “tortured
inquiries into the rights and duties of employer and employee, toward the aggregate treatment of
social needs”).
137. West, De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, supra note 130, at 1414.
138. Id.
139. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540–41 (1992) (holding that an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice by barring union organizers from property, as long as
some other channel exists to contact employees outside of work); Textile Workers Union of Am.
v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 271–72 (1965) (holding that an employer has an absolute
right to close an entire business, even for antiunion motives, though a partial closure for the
purpose of chilling other union activity may violate the law).
140. See Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty, supra note 122, at 317 (describing the
Court’s jurisprudence that the First Amendment is inapplicable on private property).
141. See Cross, supra note 135, at 863–74 (showing that, under current doctrine, the
Constitution provides only negative rights with some narrow exceptions).
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collective labor rights would pull in the opposite direction of the largely
individualistic First Amendment.142
To be sure, the sanctity of employer common law rights, the state
action doctrine, the positive–negative rights distinction, and the antipathy to
group rights are not inevitable positions. One could, for example, imagine a
legal system in which federal courts understood property rights very
differently—perhaps in a way that would allow workers greater ability to
protest on employer grounds.143 The California Supreme Court’s approach
to free speech and property rights in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center144 is just one illustration. But any such movement in federal
constitutional law would require a thorough rejection of years of precedent,
rather than an extension or expansion of existing rights.
Finally, while labor confronts these familiar obstacles when it relies on
constitutional argumentation, it faces an additional hurdle: Labor’s demands
may be more incompatible with court adjudication than the individual rights
claims of recent identity-based movements, or even than revived efforts to
win constitutional rights for the indigent. This is because the goal of labor
law, at least from the perspective of the most utopian elements of the labor
movement, is not only to guarantee individual rights or to secure freedom
for workers from abuses of employer power, but also to enable workers to
participate in the formation of conditions that structure their lives.145 At
bottom, many of labor’s demands center on social and economic
democratization. Workplace collective action seeks to transfer power over
decision making from the employer to the collective.146 Similarly, when
acting in the political sphere, the labor movement seeks to democratize
decision making more broadly by harnessing political power away from
corporations and elites.147

142. See Schiller, supra note 35, at 57–72 (describing how courts came to privilege First
Amendment rights of individuals over those of groups).
143. See Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty, supra note 122, at 310 (critiquing current
doctrine and urging an alternative approach that would provide greater access rights to union
organizers).
144. 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the California Constitution protects speech
and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in privately owned shopping centers).
145. See RUTH DUKES, THE LABOUR CONSTITUTION: THE ENDURING IDEA OF LABOUR LAW
30 (2014) (drawing from work of German scholar Hugo Sinzheimer and describing aims of labor
law as including “the emancipation of working people from their subordination to capital” and the
“democratization of the economy”); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an
Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 333 (2005) (contrasting a rights-litigation model
that casts employees as victims seeking redress for past wrongs with a collective model that
conceives employees as citizens who actively participate in the governance of the workplace).
146. See DUKES, supra note 145, at 31 (discussing parallels between the institution of
economic democracy and the institution of political democracy).
147. See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 42, at 171–72 (describing the necessity of sustained
collective action to combat the “winner-take-all” model of American economic inequality).
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Appeals to courts and to legal expertise are in substantial tension with
these democratic efforts.148 Federal courts are elite institutions. Even when
courts are responsive to popular sentiment, the process of adjudication is
fundamentally nondemocratic—at least under our current system of judicial
supremacy.149 Lawyers make arguments. Courts decide them. Labor
struggles and protests may affect the background against which cases are
decided, and worker movements may capitalize on court decisions, but
workers play little direct role in the process of adjudication.150
C.

The Current Implausibility of Constitutional Labor Rights, Even
Outside the Courts

But why, then, don’t workers make constitutional arguments in other
spaces? Recognizing the limited capacity of courts to effect social change,
scholars have urged the labor movement and other progressive groups to
turn, or return, to popular or legislative constitutionalism.151 In the pre-New
Deal era, after all, unions and workers addressed their claims to legislators
because they believed that social and economic rights, though
constitutionally grounded, “did not lend themselves to judicial
enforcement.”152
One problem may be that, in our current political environment,
legislative institutions also are dominated by the elite, and too often not
responsive to working people.153
148. Alex Gourevitch, The Contradictions of Progressive Constitutionalism, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
1159, 1160 (2011) (arguing that the Constitution is “in some ways a body of established doctrine
and law—higher law—that is supposed to limit and shape the further development of normal,
democratic lawmaking”); see also Estlund, supra note 34, at 319–25 (collecting literature on
tension between court-enforced individual employment rights and collective action rights); cf.
Risa Goluboff, “We Live’s in a Free House Such as It Is”: Class and the Creation of Modern
Civil Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1977, 1977–79 (2003) (arguing that reliance on elite-driven
litigation contributed to the removal of class-based claims from the civil rights movement’s
demands).
149. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
150. See Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ Legal
Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 1, 9 (2005) (describing how law and legal strategies can build power for a movement if
deployed in particular ways, while recognizing a democracy deficit in litigation); Douglas
NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (2011) (arguing that litigation loss
can function positively within the process of law and social change if properly used).
151. See, e.g., Fishkin & Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, supra note 8 (manuscript at 32–
33) (noting that in our judicialized constitutional culture, Americans have forgotten the idea of
affirmative constitutional duties that exist in political and legislative action); see also supra notes
65–68 and accompanying text.
152. Forbath, Constitution in Exile, supra note 109, at 179.
153. See generally LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 1–11 (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE:
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 252–67 (2012); KAY LEHMAN
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN
PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 26–27 (2012).
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But another problem is that courts oversee such institutions. Indeed, as
discussed in subpart III(A), when Congress enacted constitutional principles
into positive law during the New Deal, courts were soon implicated,
exercising judicial review over, and ultimately constraining the scope of,
the enacted rights as well as aspirations for a different constitutional
order.154 The passage of the Taft–Hartley Act then cemented the courts’
rejection of labor’s constitutional vision, while subsequent political,
economic, and legal developments further undermined labor’s goals.155
Years later, the gap between labor’s aspirations and constitutional
arguments that can plausibly be made to legal elites—whether in courts or
legislatures—is substantial. In this context, it makes sense that workers do
not invoke the Thirteenth Amendment as a source for a living wage, or the
First Amendment as a guarantee for the right to strike, free from permanent
replacements, even outside the courts.156
As Ian Shapiro notes,
“[a]spirations do not form in vacuums.”157 People must be able to picture
realistically a set of constitutional rights before they invoke them. “If the
gap between where a person is and where he or she might hope to be is too
great, certain goods are likely to seem out of reach—and hence outside the
range of realistic aspirations.”158
Indeed, if, as Hendrik Hartog has written, constitutional-rights
consciousness is based in a belief “that we . . . have rights—that when we
are wronged there must be remedies, that patterns of illegitimate authority
can be challenged, that public power must contain institutional mechanisms
capable of undoing injustice,”159 it should not be surprising that we see so
little constitutional-rights consciousness in today’s labor movement. The

154. See supra notes 111–25, and accompanying text; cf. Gourevitch, supra note 148, at 1170
(arguing that even legislative constitutionalism problematically reasserts the supremacy of legal
elites).
155. See Lichtenstein, supra note 120, at 763–65 (analyzing impact of the Taft–Hartley law
on the labor movement); JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED AMERICA passim (2011) (analyzing
President Reagan’s firing of air traffic controllers and its impact on the labor movement); STONE,
supra note 36, at 7–9 (explaining how globalization has undermined labor unions); WEIL, supra
note 36, at passim (describing how the fissured nature of employers has contributed to declining
wages, eroding benefits, inadequate health and safety conditions, and income inequality).
156. Cf. Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1753
(2012) (warning against arguments that fail to respect the bounds of conventional usage of
language and history).
157. Ian Shapiro, Why the Poor Don’t Soak the Rich, DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 118, 119.
158. Id.
159. Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,”
74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1014 (1987) (“Constitutional rights consciousness suggests a faith that the
received meanings of constitutional texts will change when confronted by the legitimate
aspirations of autonomous citizens and groups.”).
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experience of worker movements is that effective constitutional remedies
do not exist, that patterns of illegitimate activity often cannot be challenged,
and that public power frequently lacks institutional mechanisms capable of
undoing the injustice the movement perceives.
IV. Conclusion: Re-Constituting Work and Labor Law
To recognize that workers have legitimate reason to eschew
constitutional argumentation is not, however, to concede that such
arguments are wrongheaded.160 Nor is it to assert that such arguments
would never be advisable. One could imagine an alternative world in which
constitutional argumentation on behalf of labor rights would be within the
range of realistic aspirations. In that world, the Constitution might be
understood to provide a right to collective bargaining, to decent wages and
benefits, to basic dignity and a measure of democracy at work. Or perhaps
one could simply imagine a world where that picture does not seem so
unimaginable as to be not worth drawing.
For that world to exist, however, more of the citizenry and more of the
decision-making class would have to embrace the goals of the worker
movements. Public values and common sense about the key issues facing
labor would have to change. Labor’s goals would have to be part of the
deep normative commitments that define Americans as a political
community.161 And institutional arrangements on the ground would have to
evolve in reflection of those norms.
Contemporary worker movements are attempting to bring about such
change. In that sense, the movements are in fact making constitutional
arguments. Not “big-C constitutional arguments”—arguments adverting to
the text of the Constitution or even to values expressly denominated
constitutional—but “small-c constitutional arguments”—arguments that
aspire to shift the basic terms of the political and legal order they inhabit.162
The Fight for $15 again provides a useful illustration. The campaign’s
primary target is the fast-food industry, which is made up of nonunion,
minimum-wage workers, many of whom work multiple jobs and live at the
poverty line.163 They are employees at will who lack protection against
160. Cf. Pope, supra note 39, at 1135 (criticizing scholars who “have approved the labor
black hole on the ground that courts are so hopelessly hostile to labor that judicial efforts to
protect labor’s rights would eventually backfire” and concluding that “[w]e cannot tell how the
courts will respond until they are presented with the challenge”).
161. See BALKIN, supra note 25, at 71 (noting the impact of politics on societal values);
Friedman, supra note 96, at 2599 (discussing responsiveness of courts to popular sentiment);
Primus, supra note 13, at 1132 (discussing the role of ethos in small-c constitutionalism).
162. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 25, at 5 (distinguishing between “large-C” and
“small-c” constitutional rights); Primus, supra note 13, at 1081–84 (same).
163. SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., U.C. BERKELEY LABOR CTR., FAST FOOD, POVERTY
WAGES: THE PUBLIC COSTS OF LOW-WAGE JOBS IN THE FAST FOOD INDUSTRY 1 (2013), http://
laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2013/fast_food_poverty_wages.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4SG-66H5].
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termination.164 They also lack sufficient bargaining power to set the terms
and conditions of their employment.165
The Fight for $15 is seeking to organize these workers. In a separate
piece, I am exploring how the contours of a new labor law are emerging
from its efforts and those of other social movements.166 But whether the
Fight for $15 and other movements are attempting to create a distinct form
of labor law, or simply trying to breathe new life into ossified super-statutes
of the past,167 it is clear that they are seeking to change the nation’s ethos.
Through protests, strikes, the use of social media, and legislative and
regulatory efforts, the participating workers are rejecting the existing
system of a nonunion, low-wage service industry.168 They are insisting that
a union and a living wage are rights of all persons.169 They are claiming
that workers’ wages and working conditions should be determined not by
the market to ensure economic efficiency, but by the collective, the public,
to ensure human dignity.170
To advance its vision on the ground, the Fight for $15 campaign has
pushed for a reinterpretation of the definition of employer—to move
responsibility for bargaining and liability up the supply chain.171 In

164. See id. at 11 (noting that very few fast-food employees have collective bargaining
agreements); Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the
Increasing Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 299 (2005) (noting that
employment at will is the formal rule in all states except Montana).
165. ALLEGRETO ET AL., supra note 163, at 2; see also William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast Food
Workers and a New Form of Labor Activism, NEW YORKER (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4 [http://perma.cc/GU2X-RC97] (detailing the
experience of fast-food workers).
166. See generally Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016)
[hereinafter Andrias, The New Labor Law].
167. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001) (defining super-statutes as “a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new
normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time does ‘stick’ in the public
culture such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad
effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute,” and concluding that
super-statutes have quasiconstitutional status); Estlund, supra note 28, at 1530–32 (discussing the
ossification of U.S. labor law).
168. E.g., FIGHT FOR $15, HOW TO GO ON A ONE-DAY STRIKE, http://fightfor15.org/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/How-to-Go-On-a-One-Day-Strike
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL4D-UR6B]; Greenhouse, supra note 69; ROC United (@ROCUnited),
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/rocunited [https://perma.cc/LN86-BJGB].
169. Greenhouse, supra note 69.
170. See, e.g., Watch This Mom Tell the NY Wage Board: WE NEED $15, FIGHT FOR $15,
http://fightfor15.org/watch-this-mom-tell-the-ny-wage-board-we-need-15/ [https://perma.cc/8FNG
-DV22] (providing the testimony of a McDonald’s employee, who explains, “I am not expecting
to get rich off $15 an hour . . . just the ability to survive and take care of my family”); Fight for
$15, supra note 74 (quoting a Taco Bell and McDonald’s employee, who laments, “[s]ometimes I
don’t even have a way to work because my paychecks are so small, they’re gone after paying just
one bill”).
171. Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 166; see Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc.,
362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 7–11 (Aug. 27, 2015) (analyzing the employer standard and its
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addition, it has sought to engage federal, state, and local governments
directly in a form of social bargaining over workers’ wages, schedules, and
leave policies.172 The result has been new ordinances, regulations, and
statutes that set wages and working conditions far above what the market
would dictate, and far above what federal labor law has long required.173
The Domestic Workers’ Alliance presents a similar effort to
reconstitute public commitments. Long excluded from basic employment
protections, including federal labor law, domestic workers have, over the
past decade, created an energetic worker movement to demand legal
protections.174 Their efforts have resulted in the passage of the New York
and California Domestic Workers Bills of Rights and the International
Labor Organization’s adoption of the Convention and Recommendation
Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers.175 They have also helped
bring about new Department of Labor regulations expanding wage
entitlements for live-in domestic workers and workers providing
companionship services.176 Like the Fight for $15, the domestic worker
movements demand new forms of public decision making and wage setting,
as well as an expanded right to engage in industrial collective bargaining.177
And like the Fight for $15, they insist on the supremacy of human dignity
over market efficiency concerns.178
It is far from clear that the Fight for $15, the Domestic Workers’
Alliance, or similar movements will be successful in fundamentally

effect on collective bargaining); NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes Complaints
Against McDonald’s Franchisees and Determines McDonald’s, USA, LLC is a Joint Employer,
NLRB (July 29, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general
-counsel-authorizes-complaints-against-mcdonalds [https://perma.cc/YHZ7-MQ3S] (announcing
that the NLRB found merit in charges that McDonald’s “violated the rights of employees as a
result of activities surrounding employee protests,” and accordingly authorized complaints on
alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act).
172. Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 166; see also David Moberg, The List of the
Fight for $15’s Victories—Tangible and Intangible—Is Getting Longer, IN THESE TIMES (June 15,
2015, 1:26 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18070/the_list_of_the_fight_for_15s
_victoriestangible_and_intangibleis_getting_lo [https://perma.cc/L37F-4WLP] (reporting the
areas where the Fight for $15 movement has sought reform and highlighting what they have
sought).
173. Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 166; Moberg, supra note 172.
174. For a history of these movements, see, for example, EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN,
CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE
(2012); Hina Shah & Marci Seville, Domestic Worker Organizing: Building A Contemporary
Movement for Dignity and Power, 75 ALB. L. REV. 413, 413–14 (2011/2012).
175. Shah & Seville, supra note 174, at 413–14.
176. 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.3, 552.6 (2015).
177. Campaigns, DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED, http://www.domesticworkersunited.org/
index.php/en/our-work/campaigns [https://perma.cc/XD7Z-4J56].
178. History & Mission, DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED, http://www.domesticworkersunited
.org/index.php/en/about/history-mission [https://perma.cc/26NY-288X].
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changing the nation’s political commitments or systems of governance.179
Their statutory and regulatory victories to date are limited and face multiple
legal and political challenges, while unionization in any formal sense
remains elusive for both groups of workers.180 Other low-wage worker
movements face similar obstacles.181 Thus, it is too early to know whether
small-c constitutional change will ensue, let alone change to the big-C
Constitution.
But recognizing the movements’ efforts as a form of small-c
constitutionalism, as opposed to merely a series of policy demands, is
nonetheless important.
First, the constitutional lens highlights the
movements’ transformative possibilities.
These low-wage worker
movements are not simply seeking higher wages or other changes to
isolated statutes and regulation. They are attempting to entrench new
norms, while creating new institutional frameworks for state policy. They
are seeking to universalize labor rights—both the right to work with dignity
and the right to participate in economic and political decision making—that
are at odds with the governing regime.
Second, identifying the movements’ efforts as small-c
constitutionalism, as opposed to just ordinary movement politics, highlights
the centrality of social and political action to constitutional law.
Constitutionalism, after all, involves “We the People,”182 engaged in
political deliberation. By seeking new laws, pushing for new regulatory
interpretations, and making demands on entire industries and communities,
the contemporary labor movements are doing the work that has too often
been ceded to courts. They are attempting to change how we constitute
ourselves as a society.
Indeed, one can see the seeds for future, more explicit constitutional
argumentation in the language used by movement participants. In support
of their demands, workers invoke dignity, bills of rights, and, occasionally,

179. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21–22
(1934) (noting that only practice can demonstrate if something is part of our Constitution and
arguing that “the working Constitution is amended whenever the basic ways of government are
changed”); accord BALKIN, supra note 25, at 279.
180. See, e.g., Nat’l Rest. Ass’n v. Comm’r of Labor, Docket No. WB 15-001 (N.Y. Indus.
Bd. of Appeals 2015) (adjudicating a challenge to a statewide fast-food minimum wage order).
181. E.g., Aaron Vehling, Auto Dealer Asks Justices to Correct 9th Circ.’s Grammar,
LAW360 (Mar. 4, 2016, 9:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/767683/auto-dealer-asks
-justices-to-correct-9th-circ-s-grammar [https://perma.cc/Y83W-U7Z3] (detailing arguments at
the U.S. Supreme Court as to whether service advisers employed by a car dealership were entitled
to receive overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
182. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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All of these terms have
equality and freedom of association.183
constitutional resonance, and sometimes doctrinal meaning.184
Ultimately, however, the ongoing law-reform and social-change efforts
are essential prerequisites to the development of related doctrine. Without
the political and legal changes the movements urge, it is inconceivable that
common law courts—faithful to precedent, incremental in approach, drawn
from the elite—will adopt the constitutional arguments that progressive
constitutional law scholars urge.185 In fact, it is not even clear that court
adoption of new labor rights, absent political or on-the-ground instantiation
of them, would align with the democratic ethos of the worker movements.
For now, defending and expanding ongoing statutory and regulatory
reform efforts may be as important as the debate about where in the
Constitution to lodge labor rights or whether to use constitutional rhetoric at
all. This small-c constitutional effort—messy, conflictual, and tedious
though it may be—is the constitutional change that prepares the ground for
the big-C constitutional change scholars urge.

183. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
184. Cf. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 179
(2012) (documenting the increased use of the term dignity in Supreme Court opinions).
185. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1527–28 (2005) (arguing that “if lawyers hope to
leverage the law to achieve the goals of socially and economically marginalized groups, their
advocacy must be preceded by social movements that are not defined by juridical law. . . . [L]aw
should be the final arena of struggle over systemic social problems, rather than the first”).

